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Unmasking Mullane:
Due Process, Common Trust Funds, and the
Class Action Wars
John Leubsdorf*
Although Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) is a
classic Civil Procedure case, its history has never before been written. This Article reveals
that history, traced among other sources, in the papers of New York’s Governor Herbert
Lehman, whose misgivings did not prevent his signing the legislation that the Supreme
Court struck down, and of Justice Robert Jackson, who wrote the opinion striking it
down. More or less behind the scenes, two struggles were going on. One involved and
prefigured all of the tensions of the modern class action: conflicts within the class, the
relative functions of notice and adequate representation, the attempt to secure “global
peace” by binding nonparticipants, and more. The other struggle concerned the efforts of
trust companies to enlarge their turf and get into the investment business while barring
liability to their customers. The due process holding for which we remember Mullane
thus emerged from and glossed over deeper and more particularized conflicts. This
Article explores both the history and the contemporary relevance of Mullane.

* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School—Newark. Many thanks to Kevin Clermont, Martha
Minow, David Noll, Judith Resnik, and Stephen Yeazell for their help.
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Introduction
1
Although Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. is a
standard Civil Procedure case, its history has never before been written.
This Article reveals that history, traced among other sources, in the
papers of New York Governor Herbert Lehman, whose misgivings did
not prevent his signing the legislation that the Supreme Court struck
down, and of Justice Robert Jackson, who wrote the opinion striking it
down. More or less behind the scenes, two struggles were going on. One
involved and prefigured all the tensions of the modern class action. The
other struggle concerned trust companies’ efforts to enlarge their turf
and get into the investment business while barring liability to their
customers. The due process holding for which we remember Mullane
thus emerged from and glossed over deeper and more particularized
conflicts.
Mullane has become the leading case on the notice that due process
2
requires in civil actions, but it can be understood more realistically as a
class action disguised as a trust accounting proceeding. The Central
Hanover Bank (“Central Hanover”) sought a judgment that it committed
no wrong in running pooled trusts, a judgment that would bind all the
beneficiaries of the trusts and would prevent them from challenging its
conduct in future litigation. It tried to obtain this judgment without
notifying the trust beneficiaries except by publishing a newspaper
announcement, only to be instructed by the Supreme Court that due
process required notice by mail to every beneficiary whose name and

1. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).

P1- Leubsdorf_20 (DUKANOVIC)-REVISED (Do Not Delete)

August 2015]

UNMASKING MULLANE

8/27/2015 9:10 PM

1695

address appeared in the Central Hanover’s records. The Court thus
established both that notice was required and that a binding judgment
could nevertheless be entered without sending even informal notice to
every beneficiary.
Mullane’s compromise notice requirement—sending a letter to all
class members whose names and addresses are known—is an
indispensable foundation for every damages class action that seeks to
3
include more than a list of specified class members. That includes the
4
great majority of class actions. Other issues that have bedeviled class
actions were also lurking under the surface of Mullane: Does class action
notice benefit those notified, or their opponents who seek to bind them
5
to the result of the action? Are the interests of class members sufficiently
6
aligned so that some may protect the interests of others? Will the
lawyers purporting to speak for the class instead pursue their own
7
interests? All these questions were raised in Mullane. And Mullane
could also be seen as an instance of the courts’ unwillingness to address
such questions when that might upset a quick and cheap resolution of the
cases before them.
From another perspective, the history of the common trust funds
considered in Mullane offers an intriguing example of how notice and
representation requirements work or fail to work in one institutional
context. Notice and representation are central both in Mullane and in the
law of class actions. But what good does each of them do? When
considering how to resolve disputes, we usually take for granted the
traditional forms of litigation, but when it comes to setting up a new
business arrangement, different forms of protection and participation
may be preferable. The history of the common trust fund takes place in a
conflicted area between the traditional trust, an institution responsible to
a court of equity, and something more like a publicly owned corporation.
In Mullane, those models pointed in different directions, and history, or
at least the financial industry, ultimately followed the corporate rather
than the courtroom model.
Viewing the case in these different contexts can help us demystify
what might be called the myth of Mullane. Many cases that are most
3. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974). The extent to which notice is
constitutionally required, especially in class actions seeking only collective injunctive relief, remains
unclear. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558–59 (2011).
4. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 on the Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, Federal Judicial Center (2008).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622–28 (1997); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852–55 (1999); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,
85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976).
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commonly remembered as establishing broad legal principles turn out,
8
upon closer examination, to be unique responses to particular situations.
Mullane is cited for the principle that due process requires practical
notice. But in real life the case represented an effort to reconcile the
protection of trust beneficiaries in an era that still remembered the
investment abuses of the 1920s with what was considered a new and
progressive banking method for those without great wealth. That
reconciliation was effected through a complex interplay among rulings of
which the notice holding was only one part.
This study, after very briefly describing Mullane in Part I, will trace
in Part II the history of the statute under which the case arose, showing
the various motives of its proponents and opponents, as revealed in part
by Governor Lehman’s private files. We will see how trust companies,
reaching out for new business, sought to navigate around Depression-era
suspicions of banks and investment companies by appealing to New Deal
concern for small investors. In particular, it will appear that the New
York statutory provisions for binding accountings that were before the
Supreme Court were not necessary—other states did without them—and
were included by the trust companies in the hope of reducing their own
exposure to beneficiary suits. They sought to enter the riskier world of
investment companies while barring liability to their customers. And yet,
the banks may have wrought a bit better than they meant: accountings
have turned out to be a modest safeguard for beneficiaries lacking in
those other states.
Turning to the Mullane litigation itself, Part III will explore the
adequacy of Kenneth Mullane’s representation of the trust beneficiaries
he was appointed to represent, look for conflicting interests among those
beneficiaries, and consider why the different judges involved in the case
approached it as they did. The private papers of Justice Jackson cast new
light on what was going on behind the scenes. It turns out that three
Supreme Court Justices initially opposed the decision, which helps
explain some puzzling features of Justice Jackson’s opinion. Finally, this
Article will survey the impact of Mullane on common trust funds and
examine the operation of statutory accountings and other safeguards
over subsequent decades.

I. MULLANE in a Pinhead
In 1937, New York passed a statute authorizing trust companies to
pool small trust funds into a larger common trust fund, thus making it
possible to diversify trust investments and perhaps to reduce administrative
costs. Instead of having to find a prudent investment for, say, $5000 placed
in trust under a will, the trustee could use $200,000 coming from many
8. See, e.g., A.W. Brian Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (1995).
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such trusts to create a balanced portfolio. A trust company sponsoring
such a common trust fund was subject to requirements imposed by
statute, by New York’s Banking Board and federal authorities, and by
fiduciary law. One statutory requirement was that the trust company
conduct regular accountings, which, when approved by the court, would
bind all beneficiaries of the pooled trusts as to any matter set forth in the
9
account.
To give notice of each accounting, the trust company was required
to publish four weekly newspaper advertisements that did not name
individual beneficiaries. The beneficiaries received no individual notice
of the proceeding, but when funds from their trusts were first invested in
the common trust fund, a notification and a copy of the common trust
fund statute were mailed to beneficiaries. To further protect the
beneficiaries, two guardians ad litem were to be appointed on behalf,
respectively, of those with an interest in the trust principal and those with
an interest in trust income. Also, during each accounting, the
superintendent of banking was required to submit to the court a report
10
on the legality of the common trust fund’s investments.
Kenneth Mullane, a lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem for the
income beneficiaries in an accounting for a common trust fund
established by the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company,
challenged the constitutional validity of a judgment purporting to bind
beneficiaries who received no notice of the proceeding. Rebuffed in the
New York state courts, Mullane’s challenge succeeded in the Supreme
Court, which found that the proceeding denied beneficiaries due
11
process.
Justice Jackson’s opinion rejected the argument that personal
service was required because the proceeding should be considered as in
personam. The opinion relied on recent precedents treating the due
process requirement as one of notice reasonably likely to reach the party
12
in question rather than one of formal service, and Justice Jackson noted
that beneficiaries who received notice could be expected to protect the
13
interests they shared with those who did not. Indeed, the opinion held
that the Central Hanover had no obligation to undergo the “practical
9. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law §§ 100-c (1), (6), & (10)). For
federal regulation, see infra text at notes 73–75, 239–242.
10. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (6)).
11. The constitutional claim was first raised and rejected in an interlocutory motion. In re Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sur. Ct. 1947), aff’d, 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1948),
appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 85 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1949). It was raised and rejected again,
without additional judicial opinions, on appeal from the trial court’s final decree. In re Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1949), aff’d, 87 N.E.2d 73 (N.Y. 1949), rev’d sub nom.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
12. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (citing inter alia Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940);
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18–20 (1928)).
13. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
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difficulties and costs” of locating beneficiaries whose names and addresses
14
it did not already possess. As to those beneficiaries, service by publication
would suffice because the expense of doing more might destroy the
15
advantages of the common trust fund scheme.
Having thus pared away the more costly aspects of notice—personal
service and search costs—Justice Jackson was able to impose on Central
Hanover the cheaper alternative of sending letters to those beneficiaries
16
whose identity and location were known. Central Hanover was already
mailing them their checks, and had already sent them information about
the common trust fund. In the era of the three-cent stamp, sending a few
17
hundred more letters was not an excessive burden. While subsequent
increases in the size of classes have made notice considerably more
18
expensive, they have also increased the potential impact of accountings or
class actions.

II. Legislating the Common Trust Fund
In 1937, when the New York statute at issue in Mullane was awaiting
signature or veto in the governor’s office, someone scribbled on it,
19
“Important billI feel little frightened by it.” That someone may have
been Governor Herbert Lehman who, as a long-time former partner of
20
Lehman Brothers and a trustee for numerous family trusts, might well
have been interested by a statute affecting both trust companies and
trustees. It would be nice to think that he reviewed statutes so
conscientiously. Alternatively, the scribbler may have been his trusted
21
counsel Charles Poletti. Somehow the fear was assuaged, perhaps as
suggested by a reply scribble, by talking with the Superintendent of
14. Id. at 317.
15. Id. at 317–18.
16. Id. at 318–20.
17. See id. at 309 (noting that 113 trusts participated in the common trust fund). There was
testimony that there were about 350 current beneficiaries, and perhaps between 1000 and 2000 persons
with relevant interests. Transcript of Record at 42, 49–50, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (No. 378). There were larger funds but they were outside New York and
hence not subject to New York’s account procedures. Id. at 54.
18. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974) (estimating cost of $400,000
for class action notice). But see Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped
Potential of the Internet, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 727, 730–34 (2008) (advocating for greater use of Internet
notice).
19. File of Governor’s Office on 1937 N.Y. Laws 1565 (microformed in New York State Library,
Legislative Reference Section, Bill Jacket Collection) [hereinafter Governor’s File].
20. Robert P. Ingalls, Herbert H. Lehman and New York’s Little New Deal 4, 8 (1975);
Letter from Edgar Bernheimer to Allan S. Lehman (Nov. 21, 1933) (on file with The Lehman
Collections, Columbia University).
21. Poletti is the addressee of several letters in the Governor’s File. He later became a judge, the
Lieutenant Governor, and for a few days, the Governor of New York, as well as filling other important
positions. Ingalls, supra note 20, at 13 (describing Poletti as “a one-man brain trust”); Richard
Goldstein, Charles Poletti Dies at 99; Aided War-Ravaged Italy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2002, at A11.
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Banking, William R. White, who was pushing the proposed statute. In
any event, Governor Lehman did sign the bill.
What was so frightening or so important about common trust funds?
They appear in the Mullane opinion as a modest and beneficent
development in the ancient art of trusteeship, which is how the banks
promoting them wished them to be perceived. Yet the New York statute
was opposed by two committees of the New York County Lawyers’
23
Association and approved despite criticism of “somewhat serious
defects” by a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
24
York. Meanwhile the judges of the New York County Surrogate’s Court
25
stood neutral.
Examination of the banks’ concerns and justifications, and the fears
they had to overcome to secure authorizing legislation, reveals that the
problem aired in Mullanebinding many parties in a single judicial
proceedingwas a superficial manifestation of the problem of including
many trusts in a common trust fund. Establishing such a fund means that
the beneficiaries of all the participating trusts will be subject to the
investment decisions of the sponsoring bank. Of course, exactly this
happens when many stockholders invest in a corporation and are
consequently bound by decisions of its board of directors. If one
compares a common trust fund to a corporation, it is hard to see what the
fuss was about, though it is true that the beneficiarieslike class action
membershad not consented to be incorporated in a mass entity.
But if one compares a common trust fund to the situation existing
before it was created, in which each participating trust had its own
beneficiaries with significant rights against the trustees, beneficiaries
could be seen as facing the possible loss both of procedural rights and of
the rights traditionally enforced by courts of equity to have the trust
corpus managed solely for the purposes of their particular trust. In effect,
beneficiaries were being moved from trust law nearer to corporation law,

22. Under the words quoted in the text accompanying note 19, someone wrote: “If you feel
uncertain, why not have White come to Albany to discuss it?” Letter from William R. White,
Superintendent of Banking, to Charles Poletti, Counsel for Herbert Lehman (May 27, 1939) (on file
with the Governor’s File) (replying to objections to the bill, and offering to come to Albany to discuss
it with the Governor).
23. Letter of Irving J. Joseph, Comm. on the Surrogate’s Court (May 13, 1937) (on file with the
Governor’s File); Substitute Report No. 455, Comm. on State Legislation (Apr. 28, 1937) (on file with
the Governor’s File).
24. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legislation, Bulletin 14, at 855, 858
(May 18–25, 1937).
25. Letter of Richard Cumming (May 27, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). But see
Memorandum of James A. Delehanty (May 10, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File) (stating that
the surrogate courts approved the legislation). The Legislative Committees of the Schenectady and
Genesee County Bar Associations approved the statute. Memorandum of N.Y. State Bar Ass’n (Apr.
8, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). Of course, these counties played a far smaller role in trust
administration than did New York County.
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just as class members are moved from a proceeding in which the plaintiff
26
is “master of his claim” to a mass production remedy controlled by class
27
counsel and the court.
A.

The Movement for Common Trust Funds

The 1920s brought challenges for trust companies. Inexperienced
investors entered the market for common stocks, lured by investment
companies promising the benefits of diversification and professional
28
management. Trusts, meanwhile, were often still limited to their
traditional investments in mortgages, government bonds, and high-quality
29
industrial bonds, of which only the first was likely to provide high returns.
When a trust was small, adequate diversification was out of reach. Though
the market for trust services might have been expanding, trust companies
30
faced increasing competition from national banks.
So trust companies began experimenting with diversification schemes.
In some states it was already possible to divide a single mortgage among
31
several trusts, either to share the risk or to make it possible for trusts
with few assets to invest in mortgages as well as bonds. The next step was
32
to make it possible for a trust to invest in a pool of mortgages, further
reducing the risk—though not by any means eliminating it, as we learned
33
again in 2007. And a few institutions set up common trust funds whose
34
investments were not limited to mortgages.
“With the collapse of the mortgage-loan market during the . . .
[1929] depression, the mortgage pool and single mortgage participation
types of investment became greatly discredited.”35 Not that the few common

26. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2007).
27. For the classic discussion, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client,
73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913 (1998).
28. 2 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States: From J.P. Morgan to the
Institutional Investor (1900–1970) 123–43 (2002); S.E.C., Investment Trusts and Investment
Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., pt. 1, at 35–65 (1938).
29. See Restatement of Trusts § 227 cmt. f, n (1935); 1 Jairus Ware Perry, A Treatise on the
Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 452, 456, 458 (6th ed. 1911); Symposium, The Investment of Trust
Funds, 5 Law & Contemp. Probs. 335 (1938).
30. Eugene N. White, Banking Innovation in the 1920s: The Growth of National Banks’ Financial
Services, 13 Bus. & Econ. Hist. 92, 93, 95–98 (1984).
31. In re Union Trust Co., 114 N.E. 1057 (N.Y. 1916); Frank C. McKinney, Legality of
Participating Mortgage Certificates as Investments for Trustees, 24 Yale L.J. 286 (1914).
32. G. Fred Berger, Pooling or Participation Mortgages as Investments for Trust Funds, 48 Tr. Co.
599 (1929); Comment, Participation Mortgages as a Method of Trust Investment by Corporate
Fiduciaries, 45 Yale L.J. 857 (1936).
33. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 Geo. L.J.
1177 (2012).
34. James J. Saxon & Dean E. Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994, 995–99 (1965).
35. C.A.W., Jr., Note, Commingled Investment by Corporate Fiduciaries in Pennsylvania,
87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577, 579 (1939).
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trust funds did much better.36 In any event, it was to common trust funds
that the trust companies turned in an effort to maintain their share of
what was now a disillusioned but still desirable market.
In 1934, the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association set
up the Special Committee on Common Trust Funds, which proceeded to
37
seek the adoption of common trust fund legislation. By 1941, eleven
states had authorizing statutes, and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had promulgated a Uniform
38
Common Trust Fund Statute.
Although the benefits of diversifying investments constituted a
39
major argument for common trust fund legislation, the bankers also
struck a New Deal note by asserting that they were protecting the little
40
guy by reducing administrative costs. They relied on “the social
obligation they owe to all people who need trust service whether their
41
estates are large or small.” Indeed, some claimed that they were
42
administering small trusts at a loss, as a sort of public service. Bankers
disagreed as to how introducing common trust funds would affect this
situation. Some thought that the innovation would actually increase
43
administrative expenses by adding complex record-keeping requirements.
This may explain why, as we shall see, trust companies did not rush to take
44
advantage of the legislation once it was passed. Others foresaw substantial

36. S.E.C., Investment Trusts and Investment Companies 20–24 (1939) (reporting substantial
declines in value from 1929 to 1936, though not out of line with those registered by stock and bond
indexes); see also Note, The Common Trust Fund StatutesA Legalization of Commingling,
37 Colum. L. Rev. 1384, 1385 (1937) (asserting that holders of straight mortgage participations did no
worse than mortgagees as a class, and that “the real debacle occurred” with mortgage participation
certificates in mortgage pools).
37. B. Magruder Wingfield, Reappraisal of Common Trust Fund, 25 Tr. Bull. 10 (1946);
C. Alexander Capron, The Federal Reserve Board Regulations of Common Trust Funds, 5 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 439, 440 (1938).
38. Development of Common Trust Funds in the United States: Establishment and Public Relations
Approach, 72 Tr. & Est. 367 (1941). The eight statutes in effect in 1939 may be found in Securities and
Exchange Commission. See S.E.C., supra note 36, at 31–52.
39. E.g., Revenue Act of 1936, Hearings Before the S. Finance Comm., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 789–
90 (1936) (statement of Gilbert T. Stevenson, Trust Division, American Bankers Association);
C.A.W., Jr., supra note 35, at 578.
40. Supra note 37; Merrel P. Callaway, Problems of the Trust Division of the American Bankers
Association, 63 Tr. Co. 280, 284 (1936).
41. Hearings, supra note 39, at 794 (memorandum submitted by Gilbert T. Stevenson, Trust
Division, American Bankers Association).
42. See Rodman Ward, Trust Service for Persons of Small Means, 62 Tr. Co. 610 (1936); see also
Edward L. Clifford, Commingled Trust Funds, 11 Harv. Bus. Rev. 253 (1933).
43. Clifford, supra note 42, at 257–60. See generally L.B. Gunn, A Caution on Common Trust
Funds, 16 Tr. Bull. 7 (1937) (warning that “the accounting expense is almost prohibitive under the
plans developed to date”).
44. Infra Part III.A.
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45

savings for banks sponsoring common trust funds, predicting that they
would reap “profits that will delight their executives, directors, and
46
stockholders.”
Like common trust fund legislation in other states, the New York
47
48
statute of 1937 was sought by bankers and their lobbyists. Its supporters
expressed the usual hopes that it would help the less wealthy by
49
promoting diversification and cutting administration costs, while the Wall
50
Street Journal also saw it as “enhancing profits” for the sponsoring
banks. The New York statute differed from other state statutes in its far
51
greater length and detail, and in its provision for binding accountings
without individual notice (to be challenged in Mullane). As we shall see,
the opposition to the New York statute was also more detailed, or at
least more accessible to this author’s research.
B.

Obstacles

The trust companies faced at least five kinds of difficulties as they
sought to establish common trust funds. They confronted a legacy of
mistrust, threats of liability, novel issues arising from the common trust
fund’s novel approach, tax burdens, and competing providers. The
presence of these difficulties explains why the trust companies needed to
obtain authorizing legislation, and in part why that legislation took the
form that it did. To some extent, it also explains why the New York
drafters provided for frequent binding accountings.
First, the behavior of investment companies during the stock market
boom of the late 1920s had given rise to well-deserved suspicion, which

45. John Horn, Economies Through the Common Trust Fund, 67 Tr. Co. 54 (1938); Albert W.
Whittlesey, Commingled Fund Recommended as Solution of Several Major Trust Problems, 58 Tr. Co.
321, 324 (1934).
46. Albert W. Whittlesey, Post-War Trust Dollar and Common Trust Funds, 79 Tr. & Est. 551,
554 (1944).
47. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561.
48. Letter of Samuel Aronowitz, Legislative Counsel for the Trust Cos. Ass’n of N.Y. (May 12,
1937) (on file with the Governor’s File); Letter of Chairman, Nat’l City Bank (May 11, 1937) (on file
with the Governor’s File); Letter of Raymond Ball, President, N.Y. State Bankers Ass’n (May 22,
1937) (on file with the Governor’s File).
49. Letter of William R. White, Superintendent of Banking, State of N.Y. Banking Dep’t (May
20, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File); Letter of C. Alexander Capron (May 25, 1937) (on file
with the Governor’s File) (replying to claims that expenses would be increased).
50. Small Trust Business in State Takes Forward Stride with Passage of Bill Enabling Banks To
Pool Funds of Estates; Seen Enhancing Profits, Wall St. J., May 8, 1937 (on file with the Governor’s
File).
51. In the compilation of eight statutes found in the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
New York statute alone occupied ten pages and its implementing regulations occupied nine more. See
S.E.C., supra note 36, at 31–52. The other seven statutes occupied four pages in all, and none was
accompanied by regulations. Id.
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ultimately led to the Investment Company Act of 1940. Trust companies,
garbed in the traditional mantle of fiduciaries, might have been a bit less
suspect than other financial innovators. But after all a common trust
fund, just like investment companies, placed the funds of many investors
under control of managers who might be incompetent or self-interested.
Indeed, some of the entities appealing directly to investors had been
53
organized as trusts or were known as investment trusts, while some of
54
the pioneering common trust funds had been organized as corporations.
Even though only trusts could invest in common trust funds, trust
companies might be suspected of urging investors to set up trusts,
perhaps revocable trusts, so they could join in.
The possibility of unleashing a new financial scam may have been
55
what frightened someone in Governor Lehman’s office. One
correspondent discussing a related measure noted a belief that, when
trust companies allocated mortgages among several trusts, “there had
been serious abuses and that the trust company’s own mortgages were of
56
much higher quality than those held in trust for various beneficiaries.”
To avoid the danger that they would be regardedand
regulatedlike investment companies, the trust companies disclaimed
any speculative intent, and submitted their common trust funds to the
57
relatively friendly supervision of the Federal Reserve System, and, in
58
New York, the Banking Board. The Federal Reserve in turn required
that no interest in a common trust fund should be negotiable or assignable,
and that a trust could participate only if it was created and used for bona
59
fide fiduciary purposes. Later, it restricted advertisements of common
60
fund earnings. A single trust’s investment in a fund was limited (though
61
this was not to survive) to $25,000. Perhaps most important, the trust

52. Pub. L. No. 75-768 (1940), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2014). See Matthew P.
Fink, The Rise of Mutual Funds: An Insider’s View 9–19 (2d ed. 2011); S.E.C., Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., pt. 3 (1939) (describing abuses and
deficiencies).
53. Markham, supra note 28, at 137–43; S.E.C., supra note 28, at 29–31.
54. S.E.C., supra note 36, at 7–16.
55. See supra text accompanying note 19.
56. Letter of Paul R. Taylor, Dep’t Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep’t (Mar. 30, 1937) (on file with
the Governor’s File).
57. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740 § 169 (a)(2) (1936), amended by I.R.C. § 584 (a)(2)
(2003).
58. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 14 (1)(c)).
59. S.E.C., supra note 36, at 27 (quoting Regulation F, Part (a)). Regulation F is the distant
ancestor of 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2014). For discussion of Regulation F, see C. Alexander Capron, supra
note 37. For similar state provisions, see Robert W. Bogue, Common Trust Fund Legislation, 5 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 430, 434 (1938). New York also barred revocable trusts from participating in a
common trust fund. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561, 1562, ch. 687, § 1(1).
60. Trust Division, American Bankers Ass’n, Common Trust Funds: A Handbook on Their
Purposes, Establishment, and Operation 15 (2d ed. 1948).
61. Id. at 14; 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561.
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company or national bank sponsoring the fund could not receive
62
compensation for its management, presumably because it was already
being paid for its services as trustee of the participating trusts. Such
provisions secured a common trust fund exemption from the Investment
63
Companies Act, but would not prevent future controversy over the
64
scope of that exemption.
Second, the collapse of land values after 1929 had exposed trustees
and trust companies involved in split mortgages and mortgage pools to
suits by disgruntled beneficiaries. Relying on fiduciary principles, plaintiffs
65
argued that their trustees were not authorized to make joint investments,
that such investments improperly commingled trust assets while their
66
makers failed to keep records specifying who owned what, and that
trustees had engaged in improper self-dealing by selling their own
67
mortgages to trusts of which they were trustees.
68
Although beneficiary suits often failed, they posed a continuing
threat to trust companies, which were contemplating common trust funds
and were well aware that markets could go down as well as up. That the
New York statute legalized common trust fund investments by existing
69
trusts, set up before such funds were recognized, shows that trust
companies were aware of their exposure. They therefore needed to protect
themselves through legislation legitimating investment in common trust
funds and stating what records and procedures would be requiredand
still better, by providing for court approval of their investments that would
bar future claims. And opponents criticized the common trust fund’s
infringement of the principle that “[e]ach estate, however small, should
70
be kept separate and distinct.”

62. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (3)); S.E.C., supra
note 36, at 30 (quoting Regulation F, Part (b)(8)). Regulation F, Part (b)(8) was the ancestor of the
more permissive 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (b)(9) (2014).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c)(3) (2014).
64. See infra Part III.F.
65. In re Waxelbaum’s Estate, 281 N.Y.S. 186 (Sur. Ct. 1935). For discussion of this and other
possible objections, see Comment, Participation Mortgages as a Method of Trust Investment by
Corporate Fiduciaries, 45 Yale L.J. 857, 866–73, 877 (1936).
66. Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 186 A. 543 (Conn. 1936); C.A.W.,
Jr., supra note 35.
67. In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1943); In re Tuttle’s Estate, 294 N.Y.S. 230 (Sur. Ct.
1937). For common trust fund legislation modifying the ban on self-dealing, see Bogue, supra note 59,
at 434–36.
68. E.g., Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Soc’y, 200 N.E. 541 (Mass. 1936)
(explaining mortgage participation investment was permissible under Massachusetts “prudent
investor” rule); In re Guthrie’s Estate, 182 A. 248 (Pa. 1936) (inadequate records did not cause loss).
69. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561, ch. 687, § 1(1).
70. Substitute Report No. 455, N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, Comm. on State Legislation (Apr. 28,
1937) (on file with the Governor’s File); Letter of Frank H. Twyeffort (May 11, 1937) (on file with the
Governor’s File).
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Third, in addition to problems already litigated, common trust funds
raised a host of new issues that might give rise to future beneficiary suits.
If two trusts invested equal sums in a trust whose holdings had changed
in price between the first and the second investment, how should their
respective interests be valued? If a trust withdrew its investment, as of
what date should the sum to be received be calculated in an age before
computers made it easy to calculate the total value of the fund at any
instant? Legislation dealing with such matters would protect sponsoring
71
banks from future challenges.
Fourth, in 1936 both federal and New York courts raised a tax
72
barrier to common trust funds. Passing on cases involving the few
existing funds, they held that the fund itself was a taxable entity, so that
taxes might be collected from it as well as from its participating trusts and
from the beneficiaries. The banks promptly obtained corrective
73
legislation from Congress and the New York legislature. But that
legislation limited its benefits to common trust funds in compliance with
applicable regulations—the federal statute referring to the Federal
Reserve Board regulations, and the New York statute adding the New
York Banking Board—suggesting at least some concern that funds might
misbehave. During the same years, mutual funds went through a parallel
history, likewise winding up with tax benefits but also subject to
74
regulation.
Fifth, the banks might have faced self-interested opponents of
common trust funds. Sponsors of competing investment vehicles might
have wished to stymie new rivals—though in the 1930s investment
companies and the like were too unpopular themselves to wield as much
legislative influence as they might today. But what about lawyers? One
lawyer opponent of the New York legislation complained that “the bill is
special legislation in favor of the corporate as against the individual
75
trustee.” Individual trustees were often lawyers. The common trust fund
legislation did not authorize them to establish funds for the investment of
76
their trusts, except in Pennsylvania. They would therefore lack the
advantage of being able to invite prospective trustors to diversify the
investments of a small trust. Although there is no conclusive evidence
that lawyers led the opposition, it is suggestive that a number of bar

71. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561; Note, supra note 36, at 1390–93.
72. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 80 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1936); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Graves, 3 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1936).
73. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740 § 169 (1936), amended by I.R.C. § 584(a)(2) (2014);
1937 N.Y. Laws 1561.
74. Fink, supra note 52, at 26–29; Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual
Fund Industry, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 1478–83 (1991).
75. Letter from Frank H. Twyeffort 3 (May 11, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File).
76. Bogue, supra note 59, at 432. Even if lawful, a common trust fund sponsored by a lawyer
would rarely be economically practical.
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association committees opposed the New York statute, and that the
statute was crammed with detailed provisions likely to mollify or distract
the legal mind. The provision for regular accountings may have been one
of these: how could a lawyer object to a fund regularly blessed by a
court?
C.

Accountings and Notice

So far as I can tell, New York’s provisions for the settlement of
common trust fund accounts by the court, including the notice provisions
challenged in Mullane, were included entirely for the protection of the
banks. None of those responsible for promoting common trust fund
legislation said anything that I can find about protecting beneficiaries by
giving them an opportunity to challenge the acts of a fund’s trustees. The
statutory provisions were not shaped so as to promote such challenges—
if anything, the opposite. They thus resemble the features of today’s class
action and aggregate settlements designed to ensure that those with
78
possible claims will be precluded from asserting them elsewhere. Yet it
does not follow that the New York statute actually did what its makers
intended. On the contrary, we shall see that they may have overreached
themselves, opening themselves up to court challenges rarer in other
79
states.
The goal of common trust fund accountings, as stated by a New
York trust company Vice President, was to “give the trustee full
80
protection as to all investment matters reflected in the accounts.” It was
the trustee who was to be protected, not the beneficiaries. A New York
lawyer who assisted a committee of the American Bankers Association
in its study of common trust funds found it “a practical necessity that
some means should be provided for the periodic and final settlement of
the accounts of a bank relating to a common trust fund, and that such
settlement should be conclusive upon all parties interested in the
81
82
participating trusts.” His concern, and that of others, was to avoid
leaving trust companies open to challenge each time a trust participating
in a common trust fund settled its own accounts. And the Trust Division
of the American Bankers’ Association worried about “the possibility of
annoyance from litigious beneficiaries who with a very small interest in

77. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
78. See Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 108–13, 136–43, 151–59
(2007).
79. See infra Part II.C.
80. Baldwin Maull, Answering Objections to Common Trust Fund, 19 Tr. & Est. 55, 57 (1944).
81. Capron, supra note 37, at 450.
82. Bogue, supra note 59, at 437–38; Rodman Ward, Practical Problems in Operation, 66 Tr. Co.
217, 221 (1938).
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the fund might force expensive legal accountings covering the operation
83
of the whole fund for many years.”
The New York statute implemented this plan by providing for what
84
class action lawyers now call “global peace,” to be obtained through the
magic of res judicata. It made the court’s decree “binding and conclusive
in respect of any matter set forth in the account . . . upon all parties
having or who may thereafter have any interest in such common trust
85
fund or in any estate trust or fund held by such trust company.” One
result was that beneficiaries of trusts whose funds were invested in a
common trust fund would lose the right to challenge investment
decisions, other than the decision to invest in the fund, and perhaps even
86
that decision. Another was that persons who became beneficiaries after
the accounting would be bound by it, which is an early example of the
attempt to bind “futures” that has given rise to more recent
87
controversy. Not satisfied with this level of immunity, the statute also
barred challenges to good faith valuation decisions made pursuant to
88
New York Banking Board rules. As a bar association committee
pointed out, this exculpation was “somewhat anomalous” considering
that a statute passed just the year before had barred will clauses granting
89
executors and testamentary trustees a similar immunity.
The statutory notice provisions likewise appear to have been
drafted to protect sponsoring trust companies by making challenges to
their acts unlikely. The requirement for notice by publication, properly
90
described by the Mullane court as a “feint,” forbade the identification of
beneficiaries in the published announcement of each accounting, which
was to include only the names of the grantor or decedent establishing the
91
participating trusts. Directing (with much detail) the Trust company to
send out copies of the statutory accounting provisions when trust assets
were first invested in the common trust fund, and making later
92
accountings binding only when that had been done, was properly
characterized by a lower court judge in the Mullane case as manifesting a
“studied purpose . . . to avoid giving such notice as is practicable” by
83. Trust Division, American Bankers Ass’n, Common Trust Funds: A Handbook on Their
Purposes, Establishment, and Operation 47 (1939).
84. E.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 159 (2010).
85. 1937 N.Y. Laws 687 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(6)).
86. In re Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 45, 56–57 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1952)
(noting that courts have discretion to adjudicate propriety of investment by trust in common trust
fund, with a binding effect).
87. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901 (2000); Rhonda
Wasserman, Future Claimants and the Quest for Global Peace, 64 Emory L.J. 531 (2014).
88. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1565. This provision is no longer included in N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c.
89. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 24, at 857.
90. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
91. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1567–68.
92. Id. at 1565–66.
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creating “the appearance without the substance of real notice.” Indeed,
even these clauses appear to have been meant to protect the banks by
preventing objections to the investing of trust assets in a common trust
94
fund.
These problems with the provisions for notice, which later gave rise
to Mullane, were not entirely unobserved when the statute was passed. A
prescient opponent of the statute pointed out while it was awaiting
signature that
[T]he beneficiaries of the small trusts scrambled into the huge common
trusts are not to be properly advised of what is going on. . . . The
picture of a beneficiary in New York City devoting himself from
January 1 until April 1 in each year to the . . . perusal of all legal
notices until, perchance, he finds . . . the name of the estate in which he
is interested, is a picture which must have caused sardonic amusement
95
to those who conceived this method of giving “notice.”

The final twist may have been provided by the requirement in the
96
original statute of 1937 for annual accountings, amended by the time of
97
Mullane to mandate accountings every three years. Although frequent
accountings might have been meant to provide more careful judicial
supervision for common trust funds, they might also have been intended
to provide more frequent immunity baths for those sponsoring the funds.
By the time an investment turned out to have been improvident,
beneficiaries would no longer be able to challenge it. And as some critics
of the legislation pointed out, the cost of annual accountings would have
98
been substantial.
Those who sought to protect common trust fund sponsors from
litigation had another course open to them, one followed by many states
outside of New York that passed a common trust fund statute. In 1939,
there were seven such states, and none of their statutes mentioned an
accounting; at least one of these, Connecticut, had considered an
99
accounting provision but then rejected it. As reported in 1951, soon
after Mullane, about half of the thirty-one states with statutes had no
provision for court accountings binding on beneficiaries, while many
others allowed but did not require accountings (as provided in the

93. See In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129, 132 (App. Div. 1948) (Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting); see also In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 280 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty.
1947) (noting that a “colorable and illusory provision that seems to provide for notice and yet is
calculated not to give notice”).
94. See In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d at 277–78.
95. Letter of Frank H. Twyeffort (May 11, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File).
96. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1566–67.
97. 1943 N.Y. Laws 1222.
98. Substitute Report No. 455, supra note 23; Letter from Frank H. Twyeffort (May 11, 1937) (on
file with the Governor’s File).
99. S.E.C., supra note 36, at 31–32, 50–52; Ernest L. Averill, Common Trust Funds, 13 Conn. B.J.
14, 24–25 (1939).
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Uniform Common Trust Fund Act of 1938), and four subjected common
100
fund accounts to the same requirements as those of ordinary trusts.
When the law does not require them, sponsors of common trust
funds have been in no hurry to seek court accountings. So far as I can tell
from reported cases, Massachusetts is the only state outside New York
101
where they have occurred. As one California banker said, “we certainly
do not plan to seek court settlement of our fund’s accountings . . . . [A]ny
bank that prudently administers a common trust fund does not, in my
102
opinion, need any judicial skirts behind which to hide.” Whether or not
only sissies need accountings, it does seem that there is more than one
way for a bank to protect itself from litigation, and that the bank going to
court itself may not be the best way.

III. The MULLANE Litigation
In focusing on the adequacy of notice to trust beneficiaries, Mullane
may have missed the point. Neither before nor after the Supreme Court
decision did beneficiaries play any detectable role whatsoever in
common trust fund accountings. In reality, it is the guardians ad litem
103
appointed under the New York statute to represent beneficiaries who
provide the only representation for their interests. Yet the subsequent
history of class actions teaches that this kind of representation may be
impaired by conflicts between class members, or between the interests of
the class and those of its representatives. So it is important to consider
whether similar impairments have occurred in common trust fund
accountings, and in particular, in Mullane itself.
A.

The Challenging Lawyer: Kenneth Mullane

The due process claim adjudicated in Mullane was not raised for ten
years after the New York statute came into effect, but not because it was
too recondite to be noticed—as we have seen, lawyers at the time saw the
104
problem —and not because guardians ad litem were delinquent. Rather,
there were no guardians because there were no accountings, and there
were no accountings because there were no New York common trust
funds. At the very moment the New York statute became available, it
became known that only one large bank was preparing to establish a

100. Note, Accounting for Common Trust Funds: A Statutory Scheme, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 475
(1951).
101. Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 464 N.E.2d 1341 (Mass. 1984); First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Aloisi, 481 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
102. Claude C. Blakemore, Common Trust Fund Experience in California, 87 Tr. & Est. 35, 36
(1948).
103. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1567 (codified as amended at N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(6)).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 91–96.
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fund. And in fact, the first New York fund appeared only in 1944. Not
until after World War II did the common trust fund movement take off
nationally, and as late as 1948 New York had only four of the
107
approximately sixty-five extant funds.
Some causes of slow development were national, but others can be
traced to the special features of the New York statute. During the war,
interest on U.S. bonds was high enough to make diversification into
108
other investments relatively unimportant. An individual trust could
only invest $25,000 in a common fund until 1945, when the Federal
Reserve Board raised the maximum to $50,000, to the joy of bankers
109
whose devotion to the little guy had its limits. Meanwhile, in New
York, bankers complained of the “[e]xpensive and complicated accounting
110
requirements under the State law.” The legislature responded by
changing annual to triennial accountings; it also authorized “discretionary
common trust funds” whose investments were not limited to the
111
traditional trust menu.
As common trust funds appeared in New York, guardians ad litem
112
began challenging some of their practices. Guardians also raised
questions about the jurisdiction of the Surrogate’s Court, and about its
power to use an accounting to pass on the propriety of a trust’s investment
113
in a common trust fund. And on April 30, 1947, the Surrogate’s Court in
Rochester upheld a guardian’s due process challenge to the statutory
114
notice provisions. Less than a month later, Kenneth Mullane, guardian
ad litem for the income beneficiaries of Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Company’s Discretionary Trust Fund No. 1, raised the same due process
105. See State Gives Rules for Common Trusts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1938, at 29; Banks Here Plan
Careful Study of Common Trusts, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1938, at 1.
106. See Obstacles to Common Trust Funds, 78 Tr. & Est. 475 (1944) (reporting the results of a
survey of obstacles to creating common trust funds).
107. Gilbert T. Stephenson, Participating InvestmentsThe Common Trust Fund Device, 12 Ohio
St. L.J. 522, 531 n.46 (1951).
108. See In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946); Louis S. Headley,
Uses and Limitations of Common Trust Funds, 77 Tr. & Est. 465, 467 (1943).
109. B. Magruder Wingfield, Reappraisal of Common Trust Fund, 25 Tr. Bulletin 10, 13 (Apr.
1946). By 1951, New York funds could accept investments of $100,000. 1951 N.Y. Laws 835.
110. See supra note 106.
111. 1943 N.Y. Laws 1219, 1222.
112. See In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 465–66 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946) (recognizing
amortization and investments by trusts in common fund in the form of U.S. bonds); see also In re
Cont’l Bank & Trust Co., 67 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946); In re Lincoln Rochester
Trust Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 45, 53 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1952) (dealing with investments by trusts
created before common fund statute as well as objections to plan of operations and bank’s
compensation); In re Chase Nat’l Bank, 116 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1952) (focusing on
expenses chargeable to fund).
113. In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 267 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1947); In re Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 45, 50–51 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1952).
114. In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 282 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty.), rev’d, 92 N.Y.S.2d 308
(App. Div. 1949), rev’d on reh’g, 97 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1950).
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objection in the accounting proceeding that would give rise to the
Supreme Court’s decision.
Was Mullane merely going through the motions of representing the
interests of beneficiaries? Given the recent Rochester ruling, he could
well have felt obliged to assert the notice issue. Indeed, his pleading said
that, in view of that ruling, “I deem it my duty to raise” the issue, a rather
115
lukewarm phrasing of his claim. He did not assert any other objections
to the conduct of the accounting or of the common trust fund other than
a jurisdictional point that had also been asserted in Rochester. When he
116
examined the records of the fund, he found them all in order.
Yet Mullane’s representation was more than perfunctory, as evidenced
by his ultimate triumph in the Supreme Court. When the trial court rejected
his claim, he pursued an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to New York’s
117
Appellate Division and Court of Appeals, followed by another appeal
118
from the trial court’s final decree. In the Supreme Court, he filed an
elaborate, albeit disorganized, ninety-page brief, and a twenty-three-page
119
reply brief.
Mullane faced substantial opposition in court. Central Hanover was
represented by the firm now known as Kelley Drye & Warren LLP,
120
The New York State Bankers
already a large corporate firm.
121
Association defended the statutory notice provisions in an amicus brief.
Even the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the principal
beneficiaries of the common trust fund told the court that he considered
122
Mullane’s objections not to be valid.
Although the reputation of the court that appointed Mullane
guardian ad litem, the Surrogate’s Court for New York County, has not
always been savory, there seems no reason to believe that he was a hack
appointed as a piece of political patronage, with the expectation that he
would not rock the boat. Mullane was a long time member of the New
115. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 34–35. The New York County Surrogate’s Court
has been unable to find the original files of the proceeding.
116. Id. at 190–98.
117. See In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1947),
aff’d, 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1949), appeal dismissed, 85 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1949).
118. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1949), aff’d, 87 N.E.2d 73
(N.Y. 1949).
119. See Brief for Appellant, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(No. 378); Reply for Appellant, Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (No. 378). The Supreme Court briefs of both
parties were much the same as those they had filed in the New York Court of Appeals.
120. Erwin O. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? 34–35
(1964) (noting that as of December 1957, Kelley, Drye, Newhall & Maginnes was the nineteenth
largest firm, with fifty lawyers).
121. Brief for New York State Bankers Association, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees,
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (No. 378). A similar brief was filed
in the New York Court of Appeals.
122. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 35–36. In the New York Court of Appeals, the
guardian ad litem submitted a brief likewise opposing Mullane’s arguments.
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York Bar and a graduate of Harvard Law School. He had considerable
124
experience in trusts and estates litigation. He was later to be politically
125
active in the Conservative Party of New York State, while Surrogate
William T. Collins, who appointed him, was a Democrat, albeit one
126
opposed by the Tammany Hall Democratic leadership. At any rate, if
Surrogate Collins thought that Mullane would make no waves, he was
wrong.
B.

Conflicts in the Class?

New York’s common trust fund statute foresaw that one kind of
conflict might arise in accountings by providing for two guardians ad
litem––one to represent the beneficiaries interested in trust income and
127
the other to represent those interested in principal. In the Mullane
case, two instances of possible conflict between these two groups of
beneficiaries and their guardians arose. One has already been mentioned:
James N. Vaughan, representing the beneficiaries interested in principal,
opposed Mullane’s due process claim, missing out on the chance of
winning eternal glory by giving his name to a leading Civil Procedure
case. It is not clear why Vaughan thought the due process claim was bad
for principal beneficiaries. Perhaps he believed that requiring more
extensive notice would increase the costs of accountings to be paid out of
128
principal without affecting the result of accounting proceedings. If so,
he had a point.
The second conflict between income beneficiaries and principal
beneficiaries was posed by Central Hanover when it asked the court to
instruct whether certain stock dividends should be treated as income or
129
principal. As it happened, both guardians agreed that they were income,
130
which had also been the position suggested by Central Hanover. In this
instance, the court proceeding was not adversarial and operated
primarily as an immunity bath for Central Hanover, though it is certainly
possible that Vaughan would have claimed the stock dividends as
principal had he found plausible grounds for doing so. Like Mullane, he
131
was no political hack, but an experienced lawyer with some reform
123. Kenneth J. Mullane, A Noted Lawyer, 68, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1977, at 26.
124. In re Eitingon, 72 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1947); In re Sittenfield, 54 N.Y.S.2d 507 (App. Div. 1945);
In re Kilsheimer, 42 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1943).
125. See supra note 123.
126. Leo Egan, Collins Selected by Dewey to Fill Surrogate Post, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1946, at 1.
127. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1567–68 (codified as amended at N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (6)). A
beneficiary could fall into both groups, for example, if she would not receive income until a time well
into the future when the amount of that income would depend on the size of the principal.
128. In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 448 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946).
129. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 23.
130. Id. at 23, 155–56, 161. For a contemporary instance of dispute between the two guardians, see
In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 449–50 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946).
131. E.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
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credentials. He was not only a former law secretary to a Surrogate, but
133
also a teacher of philosophy and law and something of an intellectual.
Although conflicts between income and principal beneficiaries were
the only ones the New York statute contemplated, other conflicts among
beneficiaries were possible. As one banker pointed out in 1943:
A common fund is administered for the average trust and cannot give
consideration to the needs of the particular account; the beneficiary of
one trust may have use for tax exemption, his other income considered,
whereas for another it is unimportant. . . . The beneficiary of a trust
which has bought in when markets were low and yields were high
suffers a reduction in income when new accounts are admitted after
the market has arisen, at least where amortization is attempted; to a
degree profits are capitalized and the funds of his trust are invested at
a lower yield. To convert inherited securities on which the beneficiary
134
is receiving the entire coupon usually has the same result.

Note that these are described, not as conflicts in accounting
proceedings, but as conflicts in the actual operation of common trust funds,
caused by placing the funds of many different trusts in a single investment
pool. Yet they carry over into accountings, where members of different
groups might wish to challenge decisions that others would favor.
Do such conflicts call for subclassing and separate representation in
common trust fund accountings? Certainly not always. One can tell
whether any of these potential conflicts has been actualized only by
examining the particular decisions made by the fund’s trustees. I am in
no position to say whether any such conflicts existed in the Mullane case.
Even when there is a real conflict of interest concerning a decision of the
trustees, that decision may not be subject to legal challenge because the
135
trustees of the common fund have considerable discretion. Yet it is
hard to deny that, sometimes, beneficiaries will have conflicting interests
that go unrepresented by the guardians ad litem in the accounting
proceeding. The only safeguards in those situations are feeble ones: a
beneficiary may respond to the Mullane notice; the Superintendent of
136
Banking may spot the problem; or the court may see and act on its
own.
A final sort of conflict might exist between the guardians ad litem
and the beneficiaries. Like class counsel, the guardians might want to
swell their fees at the expense of the fund and its beneficiaries. Indeed,
137
Justice Jackson, foreshadowing many critics of class lawyers, observed
132. Drive to ‘Divorce’ Tammany Started, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1943, at 29.
133. James N. Vaughan, Lawyer for Shubert Interests, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, at 20.
134. Headley, supra note 108, at 468.
135. See, e.g., In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1974).
136. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1568. The Superintendent’s involvement in accountings has been omitted in
the current statute, N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c.
137. E.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051
(1996).
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in his opinion that the interests of beneficiaries were “presumably subject
to diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one
who, in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless
138
or uncompensatory contest.” This observation was no doubt meant to
strengthen the case for beneficiary “voice” by undermining claims of
139
guardian “loyalty.” The third safeguard, “exit,” allowing beneficiaries
140
to opt out of accountings, was not considered.
In Mullane itself, the Surrogate’s Court awarded each guardian ad
litem $1500 and the lawyers for Central Hanover $2000, all payable out
141
of the fund, which had assets approaching three million dollars. A
comparison of these awards makes clear that Mullane was not being paid
off for some kind of abandonment of beneficiary interests. Beyond that,
the fees do not appear exorbitant compared to at least some
142
contemporary fee awards. But the Surrogate noted that the award
143
covered only services in his court, so Mullane probably received more
after he triumphed in the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Surrogate’s
144
Court files for the case have mysteriously disappeared from their box,
leaving one free to imagine the best or the worst.
In sum, although no signs of class conflicts other than those between
income and principal beneficiaries appear in the surviving Mullane record,
such conflicts are always a possibility in common trust fund accountings.
Even if present, they did not appear because no one had any reason to
bring them forward. And because no one brought them forward, the courts
had no occasion to consider them.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s opinion did allude in two ways
to the possibility that conflicting interests might yield inadequate
representation, a possibility it had considered ten years earlier in
145
Hansberry v. Lee. First, it noted that Central Hanover, trustee of both
the common trust fund and its participating trusts, could not be expected
to protect the beneficiaries: “[I]t is their caretaker who in the accounting
138. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also Richard A.
Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. Legal Educ. 587, 600–02 (1989) (raising
the question of Mullane’s motives).
139. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 370, 376 (2000).
140. The beneficiaries were in effect a defendant class, so they would have had an incentive to use
any opt out rights granted to them. See Vince Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right to Opt
Out: Lessons for Canada from the United States, 14 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 197, 209 (2004).
141. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 144–47.
142. E.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 569–71 (7th Cir. 1951); In re
Lustron Corp., 196 F.2d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1952); Eddy v. Kelby, 163 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1947); Warner
v. Warner, 215 P.2d 20, 23 (Cal. 1950); In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 125 N.Y.S.2d 495, 495
(App. Div. 2d Dept. 1953).
143. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 147.
144. Message from Kimberley A. Sulik, Archivist and Records Manager, Surrogate’s Court to
John Leubsdorf (July 29, 2013) (on file with author).
145. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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146

becomes their adversary.” The Court was clearly correct that Central
Hanover’s goal of securing a court decree approving its accounts that
would bar the beneficiaries from future challenges was directly opposed
to the beneficiaries’ interest in raising such challenges if and when they
learned of misconduct in the management of the fund. True, Central
Hanover might have brought possible conflicts among the beneficiaries
to the court’s attention in order to be sure of obtaining a judgment that
147
could not be collaterally challenged for inadequate representation.
Class action defendants sometimes do this, but usually when they have
148
something else to gain such as denial of class certification.
Second, the Mullane Court relied on the absence of conflicts within
the class when it ruled that notice to every class member was not
required:
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The
individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a
class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of
the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore, notice
reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is
likely to safeguard the interests of all since any objection sustained
149
would inure to the benefit of all.

This is not entirely correct. The interests of the beneficiaries are
“identical” in some respects, but not in others. In any event, the Court
relied on adequate representation by some class members as an
alternative to individual procedural rights, just as it was later to do in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.150 Again, Mullane prefigures later class
action jurisprudence. And it also points out a relationship between notice
and representation requirements, often regarded as posing separate
issues. Here, the claim is that adequate representation justifies weaker
notice requirements. Somewhat unrealistically, the Court relied more on
the willingness of beneficiaries to appear and object than on the presence
in court of guardians appointed to represent beneficiary interests. It did
this even though the economic stake of any beneficiary in the accounting
was miniscule, since the trusts being pooled were all small ones.
C.

The Case Begins

Had Mullane been a class action, the court would have had an
obligation to protect the interests of class members even without being

146. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1949).
147. E.g., State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003).
148. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50–51 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d,
431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). On the standing of defendants to raise such issues, see Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803–06, 809–10 (1985).
149. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
150. 472 U.S. 797, 809–14 (1985).
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151

asked. The Surrogate’s Court is likewise entitled to question accounts
152
laid before it even in the absence of an objection. Whether because
there was nothing worth questioning or because it relied on the
guardians ad litem to find anything questionable, the Mullane court
limited itself to passing on Mullane’s objections.
Mullane raised those objections before Surrogate Collins by filing a
special appearance challenging the Surrogate’s Court’s jurisdiction on
153
two grounds. The first was that the notice provisions of the New York
common trust fund statute were insufficient to provide due process, so
that “the notice given herein is inadequate to confer jurisdiction herein
154
upon this Court.” The second was that the Surrogate’s Court lacked
jurisdiction under state law because Central Hanover “has commingled
in the common trust fund moneys from inter vivos trusts with moneys
from testamentary trusts,” and the court lacked jurisdiction over the
155
former. Although the Monroe County Surrogate’s court in Rochester
156
had recently upheld both objections, the second one was not promising,
granted the language of the New York statute and its rejection by Judge
157
Collins’ fellow-Surrogate James Delehanty. Making that objection did,
however, allow Mullane to use the word “commingled”—commingling
158
was a sin under trust law.
When Mullane’s objections came on for hearing, each party headed
down a different factual track. Central Hanover introduced the
testimony of three bankers from three different banks that to ascertain
and locate every beneficiary of the trusts invested in the common fund
159
would be difficult and burdensome. Surrogate Collins intervened once
160
or twice to reinforce this point. Mullane, introducing no witnesses of
his own, cross-examined those of Central Hanover to establish that it
would indeed be practical to send notice, not to all beneficiaries, but to
those who had received notice when the funds of their trusts were first
161
invested in the common fund. These divergent tracks outlined the
151. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 182 (2d Cir.
1987); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 679–80 (3d Cir. 1988).
152. Stortecky v. Mazone, 650 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1995); In re De Vany, 132 N.Y.S. 582 (App. Div.
3d Dept. 1911), rev’d on other grounds, 98 N.E. 1101 (N.Y. 1912); In re Estate of Andrus, 381 N.Y.S.2d
985 (Sur. Ct. Allegany Cnty. 1976).
153. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 34–35.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. In re Sec. Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sur. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1947). As of 1950, two banks in
Rochester had sponsored common trust funds, as compared to nine in New York, and two elsewhere
in the state. Stephenson, supra note 107, at 532 n.46.
157. In re Hoaglund’s Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 156, 164 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1947).
158. See supra notes 66–71, 87–88. See Restatement (Third) Trusts § 84, 214–16 (2007) for
examples of commingling.
159. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 38–41, 44–48, 51–54.
160. Id. at 41, 58–59.
161. Id. at 41–43, 48–51, 55–57.
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Supreme Court’s ultimate holding: common trust funds would not be
required to send notice to all beneficiaries, but would be required to
notify those whose names and addresses were in their records.
The case had a long voyage on its way to the Supreme Court.
Surrogate Collins filed an opinion rejecting Mullane’s objections to
162
jurisdiction, leading to an interlocutory appeal that was rejected on the
163
merits by the Appellate Division, and then dismissed for lack of
164
appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals. Mullane then had to
165
return to the Surrogate’s Court for the entry of a final decree, duly
166
affirmed by the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals. Only then
167
could he bring his appeal before the Supreme Court.
The only opinion rendered in the Mullane case by the New York
courts, other than that of Surrogate Collins, was the passionate dissent of
Judge Van Voorhis from the Appellate Division’s unexplained decision
168
upholding the notice provisions. Judge Van Voorhis, soon to be promoted
169
to the New York Court of Appeals as “outstandingly qualified,” was
170
never reluctant to dissent when constitutional liberties were at stake.
One aspect of this case that gripped him was the “studied purpose” of
171
the statute to avoid giving practicable notice of accountings, masked by
its provision for notice at an earlier time, when a trust’s assets were
invested in the common fund.
It is remarkable that so much care should have been taken by the
statute to inform interested parties of the general structure of the law,
and of the making of the initial investment in the common fund, which
the beneficiaries would be powerless to alter or to prevent, but that the
Act should limit so drastically as to render practically nugatory the
much more important notice of the judicial settlement of the accounts
172
of the trustees.

162. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1947).
163. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1st Dept.
1948).
164. Matter of Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 85 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1949).
165. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 133.
166. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1st Dept.), aff’d,
87 N.E.2d 73 (N.Y. 1949).
167. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 234–39. At the time, the case was appealable as of
right under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 because the New York courts had upheld the validity of a challenged
New York statute. Robert L. Stern, et al., Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (Dec.
1988).
168. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1948).
169. Appeals Bench Is Filled: Governor Appoints Van Voorhis to State’s Highest Court, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 24, 1953, at 35; State Bar Grades Bench Candidates, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1954, at 21.
170. E.g., People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 277 (N.Y. 1963); Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of
N.Y. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402, 407 (N.Y. 1963); People v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196, 197 (1966), rev’d,
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
171. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 129; see also supra note 93.
172. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
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He pointed out that notice and binding account provisions like that
of New York were “not contained in the statutes of the other 28 states
having legislation upon this subject,” and drew attention to the very
limited powers of the superintendent of banks to supervise common trust
173
fund investments. Then the case moved on to the Supreme Court, to
which Mullane had an appeal as of right because the New York courts
174
had rejected a constitutional challenge to a New York statute.
D.

The Supreme Court Speaks

The Court’s almost unanimous decision in Mullane took some
achieving. When the Court first conferred, the vote was five to three in
favor of reversal, the ultimate result. Justices Black, Frankfurter, Jackson,
Clark and Minton supported that result, but Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Burton and Reed would have affirmed the New York courts, and
175
Justice Douglas did not participate. Ultimately Justices Vinson and
Reed joined the majority, while Justice Burton filed a dissent, one
routinely omitted in Civil Procedure casebooks.
176
Justice Burton was not a frequent dissenter, and his brief and
bland opinion yields only limited insight into why he felt strongly about
this case:
These common trusts are available only when the instruments creating
the participating trusts permit participation in the common fund.
Whether or not further notice to beneficiaries should supplement the
notice and representation here provided is properly within the discretion
177
of the State. The Federal Constitution does not require it here.

Justice Burton’s first point—that trustors have consented to the
statutory notice provisions—foreshadows more recent law on contracting
178
out of jurisdictional law, and also recalls one of his own opinions for
179
the Court. Yet even today’s Court might well shrink from upholding

173. Id. at 131.
174. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1949).
175. Papers of Robert H. Jackson on Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (on file in the
Library of Congress, Box 164, file for case No. 378). Note that this file is not paginated, and the order
of composition of its components is often unclear.
176. David N. Atkinson, Justice Harold H. Burton and the Work of the Supreme Court, 27 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 69, 73–74, 84 (1978).
177. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
178. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 314–15 (1964) (upholding contractual
designation of local agent for service of process, at least when agent mails process to the defendant).
See generally Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (presenting the same
jurisdictionally contracting out issue but in the context of forum selection clauses); Armstrong v.
Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176 (Del. 1980) (becoming officer or director of Delaware corporation
creates jurisdiction over claims arising out of one’s conduct as such). Reliance on explicit or implicit
consent as a ground for jurisdiction dates back at least to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1878).
179. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (Burton, J.). South
Dakota may not refuse to enforce as contrary to public policy a contractual limitations period of an
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implicit consent, ascribed not only to trustors but also to beneficiaries, to
be bound without notice of the proceeding other than publication. The
reference to “notice and representation” suggests a theory that adequate
representation by Mullane and the other appointed guardian might suffice
to bind beneficiaries without notice, a theory supported by the Court’s
180
1940 decision in Hansberry v. Lee. But again, it is dubious that even
adequate representation could overcome the lack of notice (other than
181
publication) to any of those to be bound. Perhaps the best explanation
of Justice Burton’s dissent is that, even when some colleagues disagreed,
182
he regularly voted to uphold state court jurisdiction.
It must have been the desire to head off arguments such as Justice
Burton suggestedand in particular, to win over Chief Justice Vinson
and Justice Reed to the majoritythat caused Justice Jackson to write an
opinion that emphasized the rightful powers of the state and the minimal
requirements of due process almost more than the actual holding that
New York had not satisfied those requirements. When Justice Jackson’s
clerk Howard C. Buschman, Jr. first outlined an opinion, he made a few
simple points: the in rem versus in personam distinction was not helpful;
the beneficiaries had some right to be heard, while the state had a
legitimate interest in closing estates; New York had not provided any
form of personal notice; and mailing notice to the known beneficiaries
183
would accommodate both state and beneficiary interests. Although
Buschman, similar in this respect to other clerks, later recalled that the
184
Court issued his own draft “in Jackson’s name almost without editing,”
Justice Jackson’s papers contain many pages of rewriting, continuing
185
through two printed versions of the opinion. One result was to add a
number of phrases in Justice Jackson’s colorful style. Another was to
make clear that the Court was not limiting New York’s power to deal
with a practical problem in a practical way, reassuring the possible
Ohio fraternal benefit society lawfully under Ohio law when a society member sues for insurance
benefits in South Dakota. Id.
180. 311 U.S. 32, 40–43 (1940).
181. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558–59 (2011).
182. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256, 260–61 (1958) (joining Justice Black’s dissent, which
relied on the jurisdictional holding in Mullane); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
438 (1952) (Burton, J.); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643
(1950) (pending together with Mullane as Justice Jackson was one of the dissenters who rejected state
jurisdiction); see Mary Frances Berry, Stability, Security, and Continuity 137 (Greenwood Press
1979) (ascribing Burton’s Mullane dissent to his states' rights views).
183. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175. The Papers, dated March 21, 1950, provide for
the Outline of the Present Opinion and are signed “HCB.” Id. For the identification of HCB as
Buschman, see John Q. Barrett, Howard C. Buschman, Jr. (1917-2009) Jackson Law Clerk, The
Jackson List (2009), http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20090313-Jackson-ListBuschman.pdf (last visited Aug.5, 2015).
184. Id. at 4. This report of Buschman’s recollection is apparently based on an interview in “his
later years,” many decades after Mullane had been decided. Id. at 5.
185. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175.
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dissenters. It may have been the need to minimize dissent by qualifying the
Court’s analysis that caused Justice Black (far from Justice Jackson’s
186
closest friend on the Court ) to congratulate him on how he “handled
187
this delicate question.”
Justice Jackson’s opinion thus traced a sinuous course, carefully
awarding points to each side. At the outset, he upheld New York’s
188
jurisdiction to enter a binding decree to settle trust accounts. Next, he
expounded the need for notice when beneficiaries’ interests were at
189
stake, rejecting notice by publication as no “more than a feint.” That
phrasing might recall Judge Van Voorhis’ portrayal of the notice
provisions as designed to give the appearance without the reality of
notice, as well as Justice Jackson’s own quips about farmers forced to
190
read the Federal Register to discover their rights. At any rate, he then
swerved to support Central Hanover’s position by finding it unnecessary
to send notice to beneficiaries whose whereabouts were not already
191
known, only to turn once again to strike down as unconstitutional the
192
denial of notice to those whose whereabouts were known —but with a
193
final proviso that notice could be accomplished by ordinary mail.
The opinion’s appearance of evenhandedness was reached only by
painting Mullane’s position as more radical than it was—indeed, by
outright misrepresentation of his claims. He had not challenged “the
power of the State—the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against
194
those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New York.” On the
contrary, he agreed that, provided adequate notice was given, New
York’s jurisdiction over nonresidents “is sufficient for New York to
authorize its courts to render a judgment in personam against such
persons to the extent necessary for the proper administration of the said
195
fund. . . .” Actually, an early version of the Jackson opinion had stated
that “Appellant does not and indeed he could not seriously challenge the
jurisdiction or power of the state to proceed in the matter involved
196
here,” a correct statement wholly at odds with what appeared in the
published opinion.
186. Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203 (1988).
187. See Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175 for a handwritten note from Justice Black,
Apr. 20, 1950.
188. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
189. Id. at 315.
190. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947).
191. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317–18.
192. Id. at 318–20.
193. Id. at 319.
194. Id. at 311.
195. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 15. The point was repeated in Appellant’s Reply Brief,
supra note 119, at 6 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
196. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175, for a handwritten insert in a printed draft dated
March 1950.
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Likewise, Mullane did not argue that the proceeding was in
personam and that therefore “the Surrogate is without jurisdiction as to
197
nonresidents upon whom personal service of process was not made.” On
the contrary, his argument that the proceeding was in personammore
198
precisely, that it was at least in part in personam was advanced simply
199
to rebut Central Hanover’s central argument that the case fell within
200
the rule that notice by publication sufficed in proceedings in rem.
201
Mullane expressly
Mullane itself was to help destroy that rule.
disclaimed any contention that personal service was required, relying on
202
the possibility of notice by mail. Nor, despite Justice Jackson’s
203
did Mullane claim that Central Hanover must send
intimation,
individual notice to beneficiaries whose interests or addresses were
204
unknown to it. The opinion thus appeared to be slapping down
contentions that Mullane had never advanced, presumably in order to
show how balanced it was.
In reality, Mullane’s position coincided with the Court’s conclusions,
albeit expressed less gracefully and with more technical entanglement.
One reading of this coincidence was that Mullane was one of those rare
advocates who can find precisely the argument that appeals to the court.
Another is that, having no visible clients to satisfy, he was free and
indeed obliged to seek the result he considered best for all concerned,
even at the expense of some beneficiaries. Here again, he could act like a
205
class action lawyer. A third reading is that, for whatever reason, Mullane
carefully avoided any contention that might seriously upset common trust
funds or the banks sponsoring them. He did not, for example, argue that
beneficiaries who received no notice should not be bound, even though
common trust funds outside New York were getting along without

197. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311–12.
198. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 58–61.
199. Brief for Appellee Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., at 14–34, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949) (No. 378). This was also the central argument of the Brief of
New York State Bankers Ass’n, supra note 121, at 7–11.
200. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1914); Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80–81 (1909);
see Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1948) (distinguishing divorce from in personam money
judgment).
201. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956).
202. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 13, 41, 76–77; Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 119,
at 5.
203. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1949) (“[W]e overrule
appellant’s constitutional objections to published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of any
beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the trustee.”).
204. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 16, 41, 76–77. That had also been his position in the
trial court. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397, 408 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1947).
205. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4) (providing that class counsel must represent interests of the class);
see also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco, 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that class counsel may advocate
settlement opposed by some named plaintiffs).
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binding accountings. The result was that both sides won: the Court
portrayed common trusts approvingly and upheld binding accountings,
while giving Mullane himself a victory and many beneficiaries a right to
notice.
Though Justice Jackson’s destination coincided with Mullane’s
position, his starting point was the New York State Bankers Association
amicus brief’s portrait of the common trust fund as a beneficent
206
innovation protecting people of small and moderate means. As not
only a New Dealer but also a former bank lawyer and director in
Jamestown, New York, Justice Jackson could sympathize with this
position. Justice Minton may have detected the influence of Justice
Jackson’s background when he approved the opinion in a letter stating “I
207
am for Jamestown jurisprudence!” In any event, the implication of
Justice Jackson’s description of common trust funds was that
constitutional law should not be allowed to strangle such a fine thing.
Justice Jackson’s description emphasized the economies of the common
208
trust fund more than its facilitation of investment diversification. That
enabled him to argue that expensive searches for contingent beneficiaries
“would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its
209
advantages.” His opinion thus looked forward to the inclusion of cost
210
in the due process calculus.
Having established an implicit foundation for his argument in public
policy, Justice Jackson proceeded to fuzz over the distinction between in
211
rem and in personam actions as a basis for jurisdictional rules.
Rejection of broad conceptual classifications as a premise for judicial
212
decision was of course a classic legal realist ploy, also used by Justice
213
214
Jackson’s friend Justice Frankfurter, who enthusiastically praised
215
Justice Jackson’s opinion. Here, it enabled the Court to sidestep the
206. Brief of New York State Bankers Association, supra note 121, at 2–4.
207. Eugene C. Gerhart, America’s Advocate: Robert H. Jackson 41, 56–57 (1958); Papers of
Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175, at letter of Justice Sherman Minton, Apr. 21, 1950.
208. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307–08.
209. Id. at 318.
210. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
211. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311–13.
212. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809
(1935); Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 416
(1921).
213. Gerhart, supra note 207, at 165–66, 230, 305; H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter
185–88 (1981).
214. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86
(1943).
215. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175, handwritten note (noting “[y]our Notice case
suits me down to the ground and will be an invaluable stream of sanity and clarity”) (emphasis in
original). Justice Frankfurter made one suggestion that Jackson adopted, the inclusion of citations to
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) and Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 315.
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parties’ debate about how the accounting should be classified without
having to reconsider precedents that relied on the classification.
Appearing to rise above technicality, the Court could go on to appraise
the effectiveness of notice by publication and by ordinary mail in a
217
practical way. In the process, it opened the way to the rejection of
special jurisdictional rules for “in rem” proceedings based on the
218
presence of property within the forum state.
With the traditional classification out of the way, Justice Jackson
could allow the New York courts to cut off the rights of beneficiaries
elsewhere by holding that:
[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of
its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond
doubt the rights of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full
219
opportunity to appear and be heard.

Reliance on the forum state’s interests and regulatory authority was at
that time a prominent theme of the Court’s personal jurisdiction
220
decisions, and was perhaps implied by the reference in Justice Burton’s
221
dissent to “the discretion of the State.” Still to come was the doctrine
that “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
222
within the forum state.”
Under today’s doctrine, personal jurisdiction to bind out of state
beneficiaries could be questioned because, although receiving benefits
from the New York common trust fund, they did so because of someone
else’s act in making them beneficiaries, without themselves “purposefully”
223
reaching out to New York. To uphold jurisdiction, the Court would have
224
had to rely on the theory of jurisdiction by necessity or on the sort of

216. See supra text accompanying notes 193–202.
217. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15, 319.
218. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206–07 (1977); see also Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38
(1972); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
245–51 (1958) (relying on the in rem versus in personam distinction).
219. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
220. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 647–48 (1950); see also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412–13 (1955) (relying similarly on
forum state’s interests in Full Faith and Credit Clause case).
221. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320 (Burton, J., dissenting).
222. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.
223. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122–23 (2014).
224. George P. Fraser, Jr., Jurisdiction by Necessity: An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 305 (1951); Chilenye Nwapi, A Necessary Look at Necessity Jurisdiction, 47 U.B.C. L. Rev. 211
(2014); see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984) (reversing
judgment on that theory).
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analysis it later invoked in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts to hold that
out of state class members could be bound by an Oklahoma judgment
because they benefited from being able to sue as a class, enjoyed
adequate representation without having to appear, and received notice
and the right to opt out. In short, the Court would have had to treat the
trust accounting as a class action brought by the bank against a defendant
class of beneficiaries. But Mullane differs from Phillips Petroleum. The
Mullane beneficiaries reaped little benefit from the common trust fund
accounting, and only some of them would receive notice (unaccompanied
by the right to opt out) under the Court’s ruling. Thus under today’s
standards, Justice Jackson’s jurisdictional conclusions might not stand up
as a matter of first impression.
Once the Court had established that New York could establish
common trust funds and determine in an accounting proceeding the
interests of both resident and nonresident beneficiaries, it followed that
the state could not be required to make personal service on known
beneficiaries, or to give individualized notice to beneficiaries whose
identity or addresses were unknown to Central Hanover. Either
requirement would have frustrated “the vital interest of the State in
226
bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement.” Moreover,
the Court had already turned service of process from a means of asserting
227
228
jurisdiction to an obligation of fair notice. Likewise, notice by
publication had been upheld for defendants whose whereabouts were
229
unknown. The only remaining issue was whether notice by publication
would suffice for known beneficiaries who could be reached by ordinary
mail. Once the issue was posed in those terms, there could be only one
answer.
One mystery remains: why did Justice Jackson fail to cite
230
International Shoe? How could an opinion written only five years after
the leading case on personal jurisdiction and notice fail even to mention
it? The most plausible explanation is that, less than two months after
Mullane was decided, Justice Jackson joined Justices Minton, Reed and
Frankfurter in a dissenting opinion stating that International Shoe
allowed jurisdiction only over corporations with agents acting within the

225. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Kevin M. Clermont, Principles of Civil Procedure 334 n.303 (4th ed.
2015) (analyzing Mullane as a defendant class action).
226. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
227. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91–92 (1917).
228. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320
(1945); Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928).
229. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905); Blinn v.
Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); see also Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912)); Sec. Sav. Bank v. California,
263 U.S. 282, 288–89 (1923).
230. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
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forum state. On that reading, International Shoe would not have
supported jurisdiction in the Mullane case. And relying on it for any
proposition at all might have stirred up controversy within the Court. It
is also possible that, at that time, International Shoe was regarded as just
one important but not seminal case on personal jurisdiction, as important
232
as much for what it said about a state’s regulatory and taxing authority
as for its bearing on procedural due process. Neither the Court nor the
parties treated it as sweeping away previous doctrine.
E.

Aftermath

The requirements imposed by Mullane did not stunt the growth of
common trust funds. In 1950, the year of the Supreme Court’s decision,
233
there were twenty-three funds in New York. By 1952, there were
twenty-nine, and their value had increased during the past year from
234
$171.5 million to $243.3 million. Nationwide, in 1950 there were 101
235
funds with assets of about $425 million, while by the end of 1959 there
236
were 366 funds with assets of more than $2.7 billion. Two years later,
237
there were 511 funds with assets of $3.5 billion. As self-employed people
238
became able to set up individual retirement funds, trust companies
239
dreamed of channeling billions more into their common trust funds.
But growth invited attention. In 1962, federal regulation of common
trust funds was shifted from the Federal Reserve Board to the
Comptroller of Currency. As common trust funds began to appeal for
business beyond beneficiaries of trusts run by their sponsoring banks, the
Securities Exchange Commission decided that they should register as
240
sellers of securities and disclose information to the general public.
After all, they were now competing with mutual funds, which had to do

231. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 658–59 (1950).
232. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 575 (1949); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,
333 U.S. 541, 551 (1948). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, (1946); Nippert v.
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
233. Stephenson, supra note 107 at 531–32 n.46.
234. New York Trust Division Hears Suggestions for Law Reform, New Business and Investment
Facilities, 91 Tr. & Est. 816 (1952) (noting that much of the increase in value resulted from allowing
$100,000 in individual investments).
235. Editorial Staff, Common Trust Funds: First Nationwide Study of Diversification and Growth,
89 Tr. & Est. 740, 741 (1950).
236. Common Trust Funds Over $2.7 Billion, 99 Tr. & Est. 256 (1960).
237. Joseph H. Wolfe, Wider Horizons for Common Trust Funds, 101 Tr. & Est. 1075, 1077 (1962).
238. Teresa C. Campbell, The Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 32 Fordham
L. Rev. 279 (1963) (discussing Pub. L. 87–792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962)).
239. G.T. Lumpkin, Jr., Vice President, Wachovia Bank & Trust, A Fork in the Road (Feb. 5,
1963), in Common Trust Funds: Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation; Hearing
before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1963)
[hereinafter House Hearings].
240. House Hearings 3–15 (referencing statement of William L. Cary, SEC Chairman).
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just that. The bankers and the Comptroller disagreed, with the
242
Comptroller even taking to the law reviews to expound his position. An
interagency brouhaha ensued, complete with Congressional hearings and
243
proposed legislation. Ultimately, the SEC softened its position, but by
244
no means abandoned it. It still acts against common trust funds that
245
transgress the narrow boundaries established in the 1930s.
Later in the 1960s, a further skirmish broke out. This time the
mutual funds sought to keep the banks from developing common trust
funds into collective investment funds and the Comptroller from allowing
the banks to do so. The Supreme Court struck down the Comptroller’s
permissive regulation as a violation of the Glass Steagall Act, which
246
barred banks from trading in securities on their own account. But
247
gradually banks were able to enter the mutual fund business, and in
248
1999 Glass Steagall was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Whether or not mutual funds are run by banks, John Langbein
reports that they “have been supplanting common trust funds as the
pooling vehicle of choice for trust investing. Mutual funds have
significant advantages over common trust funds, and in 1996 Congress
facilitated the spread of mutual funds for trust investing by allowing tax249
free conversion of existing common trust funds to mutual funds.”
Mutual funds were reported to yield better returns than common trust
250
funds and even some common fund sponsors invested fund assets in
251
252
or turned common funds into mutual funds.
mutual funds
Interestingly, one of the mutual fund advantages asserted by Langbein is
that “[i]n some states, especially New York, common trust funds are
241. House Hearings 32–40, 77–80, 88–89 (referencing statements of James J. Saxon, Comptroller,
Charles W. Buek, U.S. Trust Co. and Robert L. Hoguet, First National City Bank).
242. James J. Saxon & Dean E. Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994 (1964–65).
243. House Hearings, supra note 239; Comment, Regulation of Bank-Operated Collective
Investment Funds—Judicial or Legislative Resolution of an Administrative Controversy?, 73 Yale L.J.
1249 (1964).
244. John Michael Webb, Of Banks and Mutual Funds: The Collective Investment Trust, 20 Sw. L.J.
334 (1966).
245. William P. Wade & Donald W. Smith, S.E.C. Enforcement Action Targets Common Trust
Fund, 13 Investment Lawyer, No. 11, at 1–2 (Nov. 2006) (discussing In re Dunham & Associates
Holdings, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8740 (Sept. 22, 2006)); see supra Part II.B.
246. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625–628 (1971).
247. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981) (explaining that a
bank may provide investment advice to closed-end investment funds); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790
F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (providing that a bank may establish collective investment trust for
Individual Retirement Accounts).
248. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
249. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?,
114 Yale L.J. 929, 973 (2005).
250. Eileen Shanahan, Agency Analyzes Bank Trust Funds, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1970, at 74.
251. In re OnBank & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1997).
252. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 813 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005); Parsky v. First
Union Corp., 51 Pa. D. & C. 4th 468 (Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. 2001).
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required to undergo periodic judicial accountings, a form of make-work
that provides ample opportunity for the court to appoint politically wellconnected guardians ad litem to litigate imaginary grievances at the
253
expense of the fund and its underlying trust beneficiaries.” He goes on
to mention Mullane, but without saying whether he considers that the
denial of notice it remedied was one of the “imaginary grievances.”
Views such as Langbein’s help explain why the interval between
254
accountings was extended from three to four years in 1958, from four
255
256
to six in 1975, and from six to ten in 1986.
Nevertheless, common trusts of one sort or another continue to
exist, and have even expanded their market share in recent years, now
257
holding at least $1.6 trillion in total assets. Nowadays they are
sometimes called Collective Investment Trust Funds. That term includes
common trust funds of the traditional kind, but also funds (apparently
holding more assets) consisting solely of retirement accounts and the
258
like. Some common trust funds are even marketed online to wealthy
259
investors. So the common trust fund has indeed turned out to be what
260
some feared in the 1930s, a competitor for investment companies.

Conclusion: Comparisons
Mullane foreshadows our current class action controversies in one
final way: considering it in its historical context raises questions about
alternative procedures. In the case of class actions, restrictive Supreme
Court decisions have turned some of the flow of mass tort litigation into
new channels, notably prepackaged bankruptcy and aggregate
261
settlements, while Troy McKenzie has recently drawn our attention to
253. Langbein, supra note 249, at 973 n.231.
254. 1958 N.Y. Laws 1235.
255. 1975 N.Y. Laws 412.
256. 1986 N.Y. Laws 1982.
257. Robert Powell, Not Your Normal Nest Egg, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at R4; Scott
Holsopple, Collective Investment Trusts: To Trust or Not to Trust?, U.S. News (Jan. 10, 2012, 9:01
AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-investor/2012/01/10/collectiveinvestment-trusts-to-trust-or-not-to-trust.
258. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2011); Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc., The Re-Emergence of Collective
Investment Trust Funds, at 2–3, https://www.manning-napier.com/Corporate/Insights/ResearchLibrary/
Article/tabid/308/Article/119/The-Re-Emergence-of-Collective-Investment-Trust-Funds.aspx (last visited
Aug. 5, 2015); Richard E. Lllewellyn II, Selecting a Successor Trustee—Why the Usual Suspects May
Not Be Your Best Choice, 27 Probate & Property 46 (2013).
259. Westwood Holdings Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 5–6, F20-21 (Feb. 18, 2013)
(reporting $2,091,000,000 in common trust funds); see also Salt Aire Trading LLC v. Enter. Bank &
Trust Corp., 967 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2013) (involving litigation resulting from failure of
common trust fund tax shelter).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 52–56.
261. Nagareda, supra note 78; Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1899 (2002); Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering
Aggregationist, 15 U. Nev. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
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the historical precedent of the equity receivership. As Judith Resnik
has shown, Mullane likewise constitutes an important forbear of current
263
Many of the dynamics of such methods
aggregation methods.
recapitulate those of class actions, but the procedural safeguards are
different and not necessarily superior. Likewise, other ways of pooling
investments have much in common with the New York common trust
fund, but protect investors in different ways.
The growth of mutual funds thus casts an interesting light on the
approach taken in Mullane. Mutual funds do not submit their dealings to
a court in a quest for globally binding absolution, with or without notice
or representation. The main safeguards for their honest and competent
conduct consist of disclosure requirements, and the ease with which
investors can sell their interests. These safeguards are of course related:
disclosure is supposed to ensure that investors and potential investors
will know when to buy or sell. Despite the safeguards, the mutual fund
264
industry has known price collapses and scandals. These in turn have led
265
to class actions by investors, bringing us back to the realm of notice and
representation. On the other hand, in a few recent instances legal claims
have themselves been incorporated, albeit without much protection for
266
the resulting stockholders.
Another point of comparison is provided by the states that do not
require common trust funds to undergo judicial accountings, with or
267
without notice. Outside New York and Massachusetts, there seems to
be no reported instance of a bank instituting a judicial accounting
proceeding in a state allowing it to do so. Other safeguards have,
however, emerged. In some instances, federal regulatory authorities step
268
in to stop common trust fund abuses. In others, common trust fund
beneficiaries have found a remedy in court. Not surprisingly, it is in the

262. Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Prologue,
90 Wash. U.L. Rev. 839 (2013); Troy A. McKenzie, “Helpless” Groups, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3213
(2013); see also John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 453, 460 (1997).
263. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 137–39 (2011).
264. Fink, supra note 52, at 77–78, 183–88, 221–45 & 249–51.
265. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust,
547 U.S. 633 (2006); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2001).
266. Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1155, 1171–75 (2015).
267. Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 464 N.E.2d 1341 (Mass. 1984); First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Aloisi, 481 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985). The courts in these proceedings likewise
rejected the challenges of guardians ad litem, though lower courts had upheld some of them.
268. Cent. Nat’l Bank of Mattoon v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1990)
(upholding Comptroller of the Currency’s revocation of bank’s trust powers); Martin v. Nat’l Bank of
Alaska, 828 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Alas. 1992) (upholding Department of Labor claim of improper loans
by bank running ERISA common trust fund); see United States v. Sun First Nat’l Bank of Orlando,
510 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding summons to produce common trust fund records in tax
investigation).
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form of a class action. Whether class members will be bound by the
disposition of such an action has raised the usual issues of notice and
270
representation.
Meanwhile, New York guardians ad litem, including Kenneth
271
Mullane, continued to raise challenges to the accounts of common trust
272
273
funds and to be paid for doing so. I have not found any instance in
which a trust beneficiary sought to raise her own challenges, or indeed to
participate in any way. Nor have I found even one reported case since
Mullane in which the guardian’s challenge prevailed, though in one
instance the banks had to procure the enactment of a retroactive
274
authorizing statute in order to defeat the challenge. So the benefit of
the accounting proceeding, with or without notice, seems to be limited to
keeping trustees on their toes—and of course protecting banks from later
275
challenges.
I conclude that, although the general principles of notice that the
Supreme Court laid down in Mullane are sound, they did little good in
the context of common trust fund accountings. John Langbein may be
276
correct that accountings are a waste of money, in which case the rise of
mutual funds may have provided better protection for investors than
anything the Due Process Clause could warrant. But even if he is wrong,
it is entirely clear that any benefit accountings produce comes from the
participation of the guardians ad litem, and that notice to the
beneficiaries has no effect other than to make it easier to claim that they
are bound by the results. It might be preferable to dispense with both the
notice and the binding effect, or at least to legislate broad exceptions to

269. Meyer v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 106 F.R.D. 356, 364 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (certifying class);
First Alabama Bank v. Martin, 425 So.2d 415, 423–24 (Ala. 1982) (upholding claim of imprudent
investments); Parsky v. First Union Corp., No. 771, 2001 WL 535786, at *9 (Ct. Com. Pl. Pa. 2001)
(certifying class).
270. Brooks v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 06-00955, 2007 WL 2702949, *5–6 (E.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d,
312 Fed. Appx. 494 (3d Cir. 2009) (showing a class member bound by a settlement could not
collaterally attack sufficiency of notice); Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240, 255–56
(Tex. 2002) (explaining that once the court properly rejected putative class representative’s claim,
there could be no class action, and other members would not be bound).
271. In re Marine Midland Bank, 354 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1974).
272. See In re Bankers Trust Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1995); In re Chase Manhattan Bank,
813 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005); In re Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 396 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1977).
273. In re Bankers Trust Co., 1996 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 614 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1996) (approving
further interim fee awards of $40,000 plus disbursements to one guardian and $15,000 to the other).
274. In re OnBank & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1997).
275. Estate of Mendleson, 706 N.Y.S.2d 228 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2000); In re Marine Midland
Bank, 354 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1974).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 248–55.
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the judgment’s preclusive effect. Collateral attack might be at least as
277
necessary here as it is in class actions.
Why is it that beneficiaries have not participated in common trust
fund accountings, when intervening class members—or rather, their
lawyers—have played such an important role in challenging class action
settlements? It could be that there is not all that much to challenge in
trust fund accountings. After all, the trustee of a common trust fund does
little beyond keeping the books and investing the money, presumably in
a well-balanced and somewhat conservative portfolio. But it is also true
that trust fund accountings offer no pot of gold to challengers or their
lawyers, especially since New York does not recognize the common fund
278
As is now generally recognized, financial
attorney fee doctrine.
incentives play a vital role in explaining the behavior of both class
lawyers and those representing intervenors.
So ultimately the lesson of Mullane for those interested either in
common trust funds or in notice or in class actions may be: follow the
money and the lawyers, not the procedures. New York bankers sought a
res judicata bath for their common trust funds, while those in other states
did not, but both approaches turned out to shield banks from liability in
almost all instances. The original New York statute contained only
derisory provisions for notice, while after Mullane more was required;
but again, there was little real difference in the results. Yet from these
contexts in which procedural choices meant little, there grew a principle
that means a lot: that one can cut off the claims of thousands of
nonparticipating people in a proceeding, but only if notice by mail goes
to those whose addresses are known. More than sixty years later, that
principle is still very much with us, for good and for ill.

277. For one view of the collateral attack issue, see William B. Rubinstein, Finality in Class Action
Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2007).
278. Flemming v. Barnwell Nursing Home & Health Facilities, Inc., 938 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 2010).
Those appointed like Mullane as special guardians and attorneys did of course receive fees. See supra
Part III.B.

